This course explores some central problems in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Varying according to the instructor, the course may address theories on the connection and relationship between the mind (the mental) and the body (non-mental physical reality), the topic of intentionality, the question of qualia, artificial intelligence, personal identity, free will, causation, appearance and reality, objects and their properties, space and time, and the nature of ultimate reality.
The nine essays in this book are largely concerned with the theory of meaning and references—semantics. At the same time adjacent portions of philosophy and logic are discussed. To the existence of what objects may a given scientific theory be said to be committed? And what considerations may suitably guide us in accepting or revising such ontological commitments? These are among the questions dealt with in this book, particular attention being devoted to the role of abstract entities in mathematics. There is speculation on the mechanism whereby objects of one sort or another come to be posited, a process in which the notion of identity plays an important part.
This book presents an outstanding overview of many of the key topics, problems, and debates, taking account not only of changes in philosophy of mind itself but also of important developments in the scientific study of the mind. The first three chapters are foundational, concerning the question of what mental phenomena have in common, physicalism, behaviourism, the identity theory, functionalism, and eliminativism. Subsequent chapters discuss the nature of perception, thought, intentionality, consciousness, mental causation, issues relating to our knowledge of the mind, and the problem of the self. The book features a number of boxes that provide a more in-depth look at particular issues.
This book combines comprehensive coverage of the core elements of metaphysics with contemporary and lively debates within the subject. It provides a rigorous and yet accessible overview of a rich array of topics, connecting the abstract nature of metaphysics with the real world. Topics covered include basic logic for metaphysics, ontology, abstract objects, material objects, critiques of metaphysics, natural and social kinds, the metaphysics of race and gender, grounding and fundamentality, free will, time, modality, persistence, and causation. This second edition includes updated sections on metaphysical indeterminacy, new sections on manipulation arguments and free will and neuroscience, and new chapters on the important topics of social ontology, fundamentality, and grounding.
Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this book represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate- libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of the four major positions- Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. The first half of the book contains each philosopher's explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other's arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation.
This book is a collection of the work on the philosophy of mind, based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 1996/7. It brings together leading figures in the area from Britain and the US. After a general review of work on the mind-body problem over the last 50 years, the collection focuses on various aspects of neural activity and embodiment, on mental simulation, on the first person, on consciousness, on intentionality, on perception, on the mind as generating norms, on its connection to the world outside, on free will and on action.
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