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This course prepares students for prospective graduate studies in microeconomics. Topics covered include essential topics for the 1st year microeconomics sequence in a standard PhD program, such as individual decision-making, expected utility theory, game theory and mechanism design.
本课程将以严谨的数理方法介绍微观经济学的理论基础，为有志于经济学研究的学生在将来硕士/博士阶段的学习提供准备和参考。授课内容涵盖国内外大多数经济学博士项目基础课的微观理论部分，即个人决策、期望收益理论、博弈论、简单的机制设计等。
This is a comprehensive textbook covering all of the topics taught in the graduate-level, two-semester course in microeconomic theory required of all graduate students in economics. It combines the results of the authors' experience of teaching microeconomics at Harvard and has been fully classroom tested.
Essential Microeconomics is designed to help us deepen their understanding of the core theory of microeconomics. Unlike other texts, this book focuses on the most important ideas and does not attempt to be encyclopedic. Two-thirds of the textbook focuses on price theory. As well as taking a new look at standard equilibrium theory, there is extensive examination of equilibrium under uncertainty, the capital asset pricing model, and arbitrage pricing theory. Choice over time is given extensive coverage and includes a basic introduction to control theory. The final third of the book, on game theory, provides a comprehensive introduction to models with asymmetric information.
remains a rigorous, up-to-date standard in microeconomics, giving all the core mathematics and modern theory the advanced student must master. This student-friendly text, with its efficient theorem-proof organization, and many examples and exercises, is uniquely effective in advanced courses.
A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint us with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what we need to know at any given point.
In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents.
This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.
The book improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow.
In the book, Matthew Jackson offers a comprehensive introduction to social and economic networks, drawing on the latest findings in economics, sociology, computer science, physics, and mathematics. He provides empirical background on networks and the regularities that they exhibit, and discusses random graph-based models and strategic models of network formation. He helps readers to understand behavior in networked societies, with a detailed analysis of learning and diffusion in networks, decision making by individuals who are influenced by their social neighbors, game theory and markets on networks, and a host of related subjects. Jackson also describes the varied statistical and modeling techniques used to analyze social networks.
